Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: the Verifier ProVerif (bibtex)
by Bruno Blanchet
Abstract:
After giving general context on the verification of security protocols, we focus on the automatic symbolic protocol verifier ProVerif. This verifier can prove secrecy, authentication, and observational equivalence properties of security protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol. It supports a wide range of cryptographic primitives defined by rewrite rules or by equations. The tool takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a process calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol into an abstract representation of the protocol by Horn clauses, and determines whether the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses.
Reference:
Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: the Verifier ProVerif (Bruno Blanchet), Chapter in Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, FOSAD Tutorial Lectures (Alessandro Aldini, Javier Lopez, Fabio Martinelli, eds.), Springer Verlag, volume 8604, 2014.
Bibtex Entry:
@string{spv="Springer Verlag"}
@string{lncs="Lecture Notes on Computer Science"}
@InCollection{BlanchetFOSAD14,
  author = 	 {Bruno Blanchet},
  title = 	 {Automatic Verification of Security Protocols in the Symbolic Model: the Verifier {P}ro{V}erif},
  booktitle = 	 {Foundations of Security Analysis and Design VII, FOSAD Tutorial Lectures},
  pages = 	 {54--87},
  publisher = spv,
  year = 	 {2014},
  editor = 	 {Alessandro Aldini and Javier Lopez and Fabio Martinelli},
  volume = 	 {8604},
  series = 	 lncs,
  abstract = {After giving general context on the verification of security
protocols, we focus on the automatic symbolic protocol verifier
ProVerif. This verifier can prove secrecy, authentication, and
observational equivalence properties of security protocols, for an
unbounded number of sessions of the protocol. It supports a wide range
of cryptographic primitives defined by rewrite rules or by equations.
The tool takes as input a description of the protocol to verify in a
process calculus, an extension of the pi calculus with
cryptography. It automatically translates this protocol into an abstract
representation of the protocol by Horn clauses, and determines whether
the desired security properties hold by resolution on these clauses.}
}
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