Verification of Security Protocols with Lists: from Length One to Unbounded Length (bibtex)
by Miriam Paiola, Bruno Blanchet
Abstract:
We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for an unbounded number of sessions. More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length. Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length. Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.
Reference:
Verification of Security Protocols with Lists: from Length One to Unbounded Length (Miriam Paiola, Bruno Blanchet), In First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12) (Pierpaolo Degano, Joshua Guttman, eds.), Springer Verlag, volume 7215, 2012.
Bibtex Entry:
@string{lncs="Lecture Notes on Computer Science"}
@string{spv="Springer Verlag"}
@InProceedings{PaiolaBlanchetPOST12,
  author = 	 {Miriam Paiola and Bruno Blanchet},
  title = 	 {Verification of Security Protocols with Lists:
 from Length One to Unbounded Length},
  booktitle = {First Conference on Principles of Security and Trust (POST'12)},
  pages = 	 {69--88},
  year = 	 2012,
  editor = 	 {Pierpaolo Degano and Joshua Guttman},
  volume = 	 7215,
  series = 	 lncs,
  address = 	 {Tallinn, Estonia},
  month = 	 mar,
  publisher = spv,
  abstract = {We present a novel, simple technique for proving secrecy properties for
security protocols that manipulate lists of unbounded length, for
an unbounded number of sessions.
More specifically, our technique relies on the Horn clause
approach used in the automatic verifier ProVerif: we show that if
a protocol is proven secure by our technique with lists of length
one, then it is secure for lists of unbounded length.
Interestingly, this theorem relies on approximations made by our
verification technique: in general, secrecy for lists of length
one does not imply secrecy for lists of unbounded length.
Our result can be used in particular to prove secrecy properties
for group protocols with an unbounded number of participants and
for some XML protocols (web services) with ProVerif.},
  x-audience = {international},
  x-language = {EN},
  x-town = {Tallinn},
  x-country = {EE},
  x-yearstart={2012},
  url = {http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/mpaiola/publications/articles/PaiolaBlanchetPOST12LV.pdf},
  PDF = {http://prosecco.gforge.inria.fr/personal/mpaiola/publications/articles/PaiolaBlanchetPOST12LV.pdf}
}
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