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Martín Abadi, Bruno Blanchet, and Cédric Fournet. Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus. ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC), 10(3):1-59, July 2007.


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JFK is a recent, attractive protocol for fast key establishment as part of securing IP communication. In this paper, we analyze it formally in the applied pi calculus (partly in terms of observational equivalences, partly with the assistance of an automatic protocol verifier). We treat JFK's core security properties, and also other properties that are rarely articulated and studied rigorously, such as plausible deniability and resistance to denial-of-service attacks. In the course of this analysis we found some ambiguities and minor problems, such as limitations in identity protection, but we mostly obtain positive results about JFK. For this purpose, we develop ideas and techniques that should be useful more generally in the specification and verification of security protocols.


  AUTHOR = {Martín Abadi and Bruno Blanchet and Cédric Fournet},
  TITLE = {Just Fast Keying in the Pi Calculus},
  JOURNAL = {ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)},
  YEAR = 2007,
  VOLUME = 10,
  NUMBER = 3,
  PAGES = {1--59},

E-mail/Courrier électronique : Bruno.Blanchet@trap-inria.fr (remove trap-)