SECOMP

Efficient Formally Secure Compilers to a Tagged Architecture

Cătălin Hriţcu

INRIA Paris

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5 year vision

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European Research Council

fresh grant

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- **Today's languages & compilers plagued by low-level attacks**
  - **main culprit: hardware provides no appropriate security mechanisms**
  - fixing this purely in software would be way **too inefficient**



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software-defined, hardware-accelerated, tag-based monitoring

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

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

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



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



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



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



software monitor's decision is hardware cached

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



Micro-policies are cool!

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- **low level + fine grained**: unbounded per-word metadata, checked & propagated on each instruction
- **flexible**: tags and monitor defined by software
- **efficient**: hardware caching, <10% overhead
  - heap safety, control-flow integrity, taint tracking
- **expressive**: complex policies for secure compilation
- **secure** and **simple** enough to verify security in Coq
- **real**: FPGA implementation on top of RISC-V

spec

DRAPER

bluespec

[Oakland '13 & '15, POPL '14, ASPLOS '15]

SECOMP grand challenge

Use micro-policies to build **the first efficient formally secure compilers f**or **realistic programming languages**

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1. **Provide secure semantics for low-level languages**
   - C with protected components and memory safety

SECOMP grand challenge

Use micro-policies to build **the first efficient formally secure compilers for realistic programming languages**

1. **Provide secure semantics for low-level languages**
   - C with protected components and memory safety
2. **Enforce secure interoperability with lower-level code**
   - ASM, C, and F* [F* = ML + verification]

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holy grail of secure compilation, enforcing abstractions all the way down

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

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

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

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

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

Benefit: **sound security reasoning in the source language**

forget about compiler chain (linker, loader, runtime system)

forget that libraries are written in a lower-level language

SECOMP: achieving full abstraction at scale

F* language
(ML + verification)

miTLS*

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Recent preliminary work, joint with Yannis Juglaret et al

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

invariant:
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

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

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Secure compartmentalizing compilation

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

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

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

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∃ high-level attack from some fully defined A_2, A_4, A_5



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

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

follows from "structured full abstraction
for unsafe languages" + "separate compilation"

[Beyond Good and Evil, Juglaret, Hritcu, et al, CSF'16]

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

  - functional purity, termination, relational reasoning
  - **push these limits further and combine with static analysis**

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- **Secure micro-policy composition**
  - micro-policies are **interferent** reference monitors
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

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

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

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- **Measuring & lowering the cost of secure compilation**
- Most of this is **vaporware** at this point but ...
  - trying to build a community and looking for collaborators & students & PostDocs to try to make some of this real