

# Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key Exchange

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**Abstract**—We present a mechanized proof of the password-based protocol One-Encryption Key Exchange (OEKE) using the computationally-sound protocol prover CryptoVerif. OEKE is a non-trivial protocol, and thus mechanizing its proof provides additional confidence that it is correct. This case study was also an opportunity to implement several important extensions of CryptoVerif, useful for proving many other protocols. We have indeed extended CryptoVerif to support the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption. We have also added support for proofs that rely on Shoup’s lemma and additional game transformations. In particular, it is now possible to insert case distinctions manually and to merge cases that no longer need to be distinguished. Eventually, some improvements have been added on the computation of the probability bounds for attacks, providing better reductions. In particular, we improve over the standard computation of probabilities when Shoup’s lemma is used, which allows us to improve the bound given in a previous manual proof of OEKE, and to show that the adversary can test at most one password per session of the protocol. In this paper, we present these extensions, with their application to the proof of OEKE. All steps of the proof, both automatic and manually guided, are verified by CryptoVerif.

**Keywords**-Automatic proofs, Formal methods, Provable security, Protocols, Password-based authentication

## I. INTRODUCTION

Since the beginning of public-key cryptography, more and more complex security notions have been defined, with protocols getting also more intricate. Initially, a long time without attack was a good argument in favor of the security of a scheme. But some schemes took a long time before being broken. A famous example is the Chor-Rivest cryptosystem [1], [2], which took more than 10 years to be totally broken [3]. Nowadays, the lack of attacks is no longer considered as a security validation, and provable security is a requirement for any new proposal.

The basic idea of provable security consists in reducing a well-known hard problem to an attack, in the complexity theory framework. Such a reduction guarantees that an efficient adversary against the cryptosystem could be converted into an efficient algorithm against the hard problem. First security proofs were essentially theoretical, providing polynomial reductions only. But “exact security” [4] or “concrete security” [5] asked for more efficient reductions.

Unfortunately, a security result should be considered with care. As explained above, it consists of a theorem which states that under a precise intractability assumption a specific security model (goals and means of the adversary) is satisfied. The reduction constitutes the proof of the theorem. Weaknesses can appear at several steps: the intractability assumption can be too strong, or even wrong; the security model might not correspond to the expected security level; the reduction may not be tight; and the proof can be erroneous. Because of more and more complex security models and proofs, most of them are never (double)-checked.

A famous example is the OAEP construction [6] that has been proven to achieve chosen-ciphertext security. But because of ambiguous security models in the early 90s, there was no real difference between the so-called IND-CCA1 and IND-CCA2 security levels. As a consequence, the proof was believed to achieve the IND-CCA2 level, until Shoup [7] exhibited a counter-example. Fortunately, a complete proof for IND-CCA2 has quickly been provided [8]. A machine-checked proof has later been provided [9].

As suggested by Halevi [10], computers could help in verifying proofs. This paper follows this path, with computationally-sound computer-aided proof and verification of cryptographic protocols.

*Related Work:* Various methods have been proposed for reaching Halevi’s goal. Following the seminal paper by Abadi and Rogaway [11], many results show the soundness of the Dolev-Yao model with respect to the computational model, which makes it possible to use Dolev-Yao provers in order to prove protocols in the computational model (see, e.g., [12], [13], [14], [15], [16] and the survey [17]). However, these results have limitations, in particular in terms of allowed cryptographic primitives (they must satisfy strong security properties so that they correspond to Dolev-Yao style primitives), and they require some restrictions on protocols (such as the absence of key cycles). A tool [18] was developed based on [12] to obtain computational proofs using the formal verifier AVISPA, for protocols that rely on public-key encryption and signatures.

Several frameworks exist for formalizing proofs of protocols in the computational model. Backes, Pfitzmann, and Waidner [19], [20] designed an abstract cryptographic library

and showed its soundness with respect to computational primitives, under arbitrary active attacks. This framework has been used for a computationally-sound machine-checked proof of the Needham-Schroeder-Lowe protocol [21], [22]. Canetti [23] introduced the notion of universal composability. With Herzog [24], they show how a Dolev-Yao-style symbolic analysis can be used to prove security properties of protocols within the framework of universal composability, for a restricted class of protocols using public-key encryption as only cryptographic primitive. Then, they use the automatic Dolev-Yao verification tool ProVerif [25] for verifying protocols in this framework. Process calculi have been designed for representing cryptographic games, such as the probabilistic polynomial-time calculus of [26] and the cryptographic lambda-calculus of [27]. Logics have also been designed for proving security protocols in the computational model, such as the computational variant of PCL (Protocol Composition Logic) [28], [29] and CIL (Computational Indistinguishability Logic) [30]. Canetti *et al.* [31] use the framework of time-bounded task-PIOAs (Probabilistic Input/Output Automata) to prove security protocols in the computational model. This framework makes it possible to combine probabilistic and non-deterministic behaviors. These frameworks can be used to prove security properties of protocols in the computational sense, but except for [24] which relies on a Dolev-Yao prover, they have not been automated up to now, as far as we know.

Several techniques have been used for directly mechanizing proofs in the computational model. Type systems [32], [33], [34], [35] provide computational security guarantees. For instance, [32] handles shared-key and public-key encryption, with an unbounded number of sessions, by relying on the Backes-Pfitzmann-Waidner library. A type inference algorithm is given in [36]. In another line of research, a specialized Hoare logic was designed for proving asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model [37], [38].

The tool CertiCrypt [39], [40], [41], [42], [9] enables the machine-checked construction and verification of cryptographic proofs by sequences of games [43], [44]. It relies on the general-purpose proof assistant Coq, which is widely believed to be correct. EasyCrypt [45] generates CertiCrypt proofs from proof sketches that formally represent the sequence of games and hints, which makes the tool easier to use. Nowak *et al.* [46], [47], [48] follow a similar idea by providing Coq proofs for several cryptographic primitives.

Independently, we have built the tool CryptoVerif [49] to help cryptographers, not only for the verification, but also by generating the proofs by sequences of games [43], [44], automatically or with little user interaction. The games are formalized in a probabilistic polynomial-time process calculus. CryptoVerif provides a generic method for specifying security properties of many cryptographic primitives. It proves secrecy and authentication properties. It also provides a bound on the probability of success of an attack. It has

already been used to prove several cryptographic protocols, and also primitives [50]. This tool extends considerably early work by Laud [51], [52] which was limited either to passive adversaries or to a single session of the protocol. More recently, Tšahhrirov and Laud [53], [54] developed a tool similar to CryptoVerif but that represents games by dependency graphs. It handles public-key and shared-key encryption and proves secrecy properties; it does not provide bounds on the probability of success of an attack.

*Contributions:* In this paper, we use the tool CryptoVerif in order to prove the password-based key exchange protocol One-Encryption Key-Exchange (OEKE) [55], a variant of Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE) [56]. This is a non-trivial case study, since EKE was not proved correct before 2003, 10 years after its publication. This mechanized proof provides additional confidence that the protocol OEKE is secure. More precisely, we have shown that OEKE guarantees the secrecy of the session key and the authentication of the client to the server. The proof combines manually-guided and automatic steps, as detailed in Section IV. With the manual proof indications included in the CryptoVerif input file, the runtime of CryptoVerif version 1.14 for this proof was 3 s on an Intel Core i5 2.67 GHz (4 cores).

This case study was also an opportunity for implementing several extensions of CryptoVerif, useful for proving many other protocols. Here are these extensions:

- CryptoVerif’s specification mechanism for assumptions on primitives did not support the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, needed for proving OEKE and many important protocols. We have extended it to support CDH (Section III-D). This extension also allowed us to prove a signed Diffie-Hellman protocol, in a fully automatic way.
- We have extended CryptoVerif to be able to apply Shoup’s lemma [43], by introducing events and later bounding their probability. We improve over the standard computation of probabilities, for applications of Shoup’s lemma, by avoiding to count several times probabilities that in fact correspond to the same runs. This allows us to obtain better probability bounds than [55] and to show that the adversary can test at most one password per session of the client or the server, which is the optimal result. This improvement applies both to CryptoVerif proofs and to manual proofs, and it is not specific to the OEKE protocol (Section IV-A).
- Additional game transformations were also needed for manually introducing case distinctions or for merging cases. We have implemented these transformations (Sections IV-A and IV-C).
- Password-based protocols require a careful computation of the probability of an attack, since one aims to compute how many passwords the adversary can test by interacting with the protocol. We have improved CryptoVerif in this respect (Section IV-D).

*Outline:* We recall the protocol OEKE in the next section. Section III presents the CryptoVerif model of the protocol, and Section IV presents its proof. We conclude in Section V. The long version of the paper [57], the tool CryptoVerif, and the input and output files can be found at <http://www.cryptoverif.ens.fr/OEKE/>.

*Notations:*  $|S|$  denotes the cardinal of the set  $S$ .  $\#O$  denotes the number of calls to oracle  $O$ .

## II. THE OEKE PROTOCOL

Password-authenticated key exchange protocols allow two parties that share a low-entropy common secret (a password) to agree on a common high-entropy secret key thereafter used with symmetric primitives, such as symmetric encryption for privacy and message authentication codes for authentication. The goal of such a protocol is to guarantee the secrecy of the resulting common key between the two participating players. Furthermore, the protocol should succeed if and only if the two players actually share the same password, which guarantees the identity of the partner to both of them. Because of the low-entropy, an active adversary will succeed in impersonating a party to the other one with non-negligible probability by successive password guesses. Such an on-line dictionary attack is unavoidable. However, one should guarantee that this is the best attack: one active attack allows the adversary to test and thus eliminate at most one password, and not more. Namely, passive attacks should not (computationally) leak any information about the password. One definitely wants to prevent off-line dictionary attacks, where after a few active attacks and possibly many passive ones the collected information is enough to eliminate many passwords, and thus accelerate impersonation from the on-line dictionary attack.

The first password-authenticated key exchange protocol has been proposed by Bellare and Merritt [56], the Encrypted Key Exchange (EKE). This is basically a Diffie-Hellman key exchange where the two flows are encrypted with a symmetric encryption scheme, using the password as secret key. Several variants have thereafter been proposed, such as AuthA [58]. The One-Encryption Key Exchange protocol (OEKE) studied in [55] is the particular variant where the second flow only is encrypted under the password, and the first player proves his knowledge of the password with an additional key confirmation flow. Figure 1 provides a description of this OEKE protocol, which guarantees client authentication and key secrecy, under the assumptions that  $\mathcal{H}_0$  and  $\mathcal{H}_1$  are random oracles, that  $\mathcal{E}$  and  $\mathcal{D}$  are respectively the encryption and decryption of an ideal cipher, and that  $\mathbb{G}$  is a finite group of prime order  $q$ , with generator  $g$ , in which the computational Diffie-Hellman problem is hard (see the definition in Section III-D), as proven in [55]. If the password  $pw$  is chosen among a finite dictionary *passwd* of size  $N$  equipped with the uniform distribution, their proof shows that the probability for any adversary,




Figure 1. An execution of OEKE, run by client  $U$  and server  $S$ . The session key is  $sk = \mathcal{H}_0(U\|S\|X\|Y\|Y^x) = \mathcal{H}_0(U\|S\|X\|Y\|X^y)$ .

within time  $t$ , and with less than  $N_U$  sessions with a client,  $N_S$  sessions with a server (active attacks) and  $N_P$  passive eavesdroppings (passive attacks), and, asking  $q_h$  hash-queries and  $q_e$  encryption/decryption queries, to make a server instance accept with no terminating client partner is bounded by

$$\frac{N_U + 2N_S}{N} + 3q_h \times \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + p_{\text{coll}}$$

with  $p_{\text{coll}} = \frac{(2q_e + 2N_U + 3N_S + 3N_P)^2}{2(q-1)} + \frac{q_h^2 + 4N_s}{2^{\ell_1+1}}$

where  $\ell_1$  is the length of the output of  $\mathcal{H}_1$  and  $t' \leq t + (N_U + N_S + N_P + q_e + 1) \cdot \tau_{\text{exp}}$ , with  $\tau_{\text{exp}}$  denoting the computation time for an exponentiation in  $\mathbb{G}$ .<sup>1</sup> Furthermore,  $\text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t)$  denotes the maximal success probability an adversary can gain within time  $t$  against the computational Diffie-Hellman problem in  $\mathbb{G}$ . Similarly, no adversary can distinguish the session key from a random key with advantage greater than

$$\frac{2N_U + 4N_S}{N} + 8q_h \times \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + 2p_{\text{coll}}.$$

The proofs basically show that the unique way for the adversary to gain something (against both client authentication and secrecy of the session key) is to correctly guess the password, by either sending a  $Y^*$  that is really an encryption under the correct password, or using the correct password to

<sup>1</sup>In [55], they use as parameter the number  $q_s$  of interactions with the parties, instead of the numbers of sessions  $N_U$  and  $N_S$ . It is straightforward to recompute the probabilities to use  $N_S$  and  $N_U$  instead, and this yields a more precise evaluation.

decrypt  $Y^*$  and compute the authenticator  $Auth$ . One could hope to prove that the former event, denoted `Encrypt`, is bounded by  $NU/N$  and the latter event, denoted `Auth`, is bounded by  $NS/N$ . But, because of the way probabilities are computed when one uses Shoup’s lemma [43], some factor appears to the  $(NU + NS)/N$  main term.

### III. MODELING OEKE IN CRYPTOVERIF

In this section, we present the model of the protocol given as input to `CryptoVerif`. We first recall some basic ideas behind `CryptoVerif`, and then present the model itself: the security assumptions on the primitives, the model of the protocol, and the security properties that we want to prove. The complete `CryptoVerif` model, and the reusable library that provides the definitions of cryptographic primitives, can be found at <http://www.cryptoverif.ens.fr/OEKE/>.

#### A. Review of `CryptoVerif`

`CryptoVerif` builds proofs by sequences of games [43], [44]. It starts from the initial game given as input, which represents the protocol to prove in interaction with an adversary. Then, it transforms this game step by step using a set of predefined game transformations, such that each game is indistinguishable from the previous one.

More formally, a game  $G$  interacts with an adversary represented by a *context*  $C$ , and we denote by  $C[G]$  the combination of  $C$  and  $G$ . During execution,  $C[G]$  may execute events, collected in a sequence  $\mathcal{E}$ , and finally returns a result  $a$ , either a bitstring or the special value `abort` when the game has been aborted. These events and result can be used to distinguish games, so we introduce an additional algorithm, a *distinguisher*  $D$  that takes as input the sequence of events  $\mathcal{E}$  and the result  $a$ , and returns `true` or `false`. An example of distinguisher is  $D_e$  defined by  $D_e(\mathcal{E}, a) = \text{true}$  if and only if  $e \in \mathcal{E}$ : this distinguisher detects the execution of event  $e$ . We will denote the distinguisher  $D_e$  simply by  $e$ . More generally, distinguishers can detect various properties of the sequence of events  $\mathcal{E}$  executed by the game and of its result  $a$ . We denote by  $D \vee D'$ ,  $D \wedge D'$ , and  $\neg D$  the distinguishers such that  $(D \vee D')(\mathcal{E}, a) = D(\mathcal{E}, a) \vee D'(\mathcal{E}, a)$ ,  $(D \wedge D')(\mathcal{E}, a) = D(\mathcal{E}, a) \wedge D'(\mathcal{E}, a)$ , and  $(\neg D)(\mathcal{E}, a) = \neg D(\mathcal{E}, a)$ , where  $\vee$  is the logical disjunction,  $\wedge$  the logical conjunction, and  $\neg$  the logical negation. We denote by  $\Pr[C[G] : D]$  the probability that  $C[G]$  executes a sequence of events  $\mathcal{E}$  and returns a result  $a$ , such that  $D(\mathcal{E}, a) = \text{true}$ .

A context  $C$  is acceptable for  $G$  with public variables  $V$  when it can read directly the variables of  $G$  that are in  $V$ , and it makes no other access to variables of  $G$ . We define indistinguishability as an equivalence  $G \approx_p^V G'$ :

**Definition 1 (Indistinguishability)** We write  $G \approx_p^V G'$  when, for all contexts  $C$  acceptable for  $G$  and  $G'$  with public variables  $V$  and all distinguishers  $D$  that run in time at most  $t_D$ ,  $|\Pr[C[G] : D] - \Pr[C[G'] : D]| \leq p(C, t_D)$ .

This definition formalizes that the probability that algorithms  $C$  and  $D$  distinguish the games  $G$  and  $G'$  is at most  $p(C, t_D)$ . The probability  $p$  typically depends on the runtime of  $C$  and  $D$ , but may also depend on other parameters, such as the number of queries to each oracle made by  $C$ . That is why  $p$  takes as arguments the whole algorithm  $C$  and the runtime of  $D$ . When  $V$  is empty, we write  $G \approx_p G'$ . Therefore, we obtain a sequence of indistinguishable games  $G_0 \approx_{p_1}^V G_1 \approx_{p_2}^V G_2 \dots G_{n-1} \approx_{p_n}^V G_n$ , which implies  $G_0 \approx_{p_1 + \dots + p_n}^V G_n$ . In the last game  $G_n$ , the desired security property is proved by direct inspection of the game, without using any computational assumption. For example, to bound the probability that an event  $e$  is executed, event  $e$  does not occur at all in the last game, so  $\Pr[C[G_n] : e] = 0$ , hence the probability of executing  $e$  in the initial game is  $\Pr[C[G_0] : e] \leq (p_1 + \dots + p_n)(C, e)$ .

The game transformations used by `CryptoVerif` can be split into two categories:

- syntactic transformations, which are used by `CryptoVerif` to simplify games and to prepare cryptographic transformations. These transformations do not rely on any security assumption on primitives.
- cryptographic transformations, which rely on a security assumption on a primitive. These security assumptions are themselves formalized as indistinguishability properties  $L \approx_p R$ , which are given as input to `CryptoVerif` and need to be proved manually. They are proved once for each primitive and can then be reused in many protocols. We present such equivalences for the primitives used in OEKE below.

`CryptoVerif` uses these equivalences to perform proofs by reduction automatically. It detects that a game  $G$  can be written as a context  $C$  that calls the oracles of  $L$ , that is,  $G \approx_0^V C[L]$  by purely syntactic transformations, and builds a game  $G'$  such that  $C[R] \approx_0^V G'$  by purely syntactic transformations.  $C$  is the simulator usually defined for reductions. From  $L \approx_p R$ , we can infer that  $C[L] \approx_p^V C[R]$  where  $V$  is a subset of the variables of  $C$  and  $p'(C', t_D) = p(C'[C[]], t_D)$ . Indeed, if  $C'$  is the adversary against  $C[L] \approx_p^V C[R]$ , the adversary against  $L \approx_p R$  is  $C'[C[]]$ . Therefore,  $G \approx_p^V G'$  and `CryptoVerif` can transform  $G$  into  $G'$ .

#### B. The Random Oracle Model

The random oracle model was introduced in [59] to model hash functions. It was encoded in `CryptoVerif` in [50]. We improve this model by using the equivalence  $L_1 \approx_{\#\text{Oeq}/|\text{hashoutput}|} R_1$  where  $L_1$  and  $R_1$  are defined in Figure 2. This model is not specific to OEKE. The hash function `hash` takes as input a key of type *key* and the bitstring to hash of type *hashinput* and returns a result of type *hashoutput*. The key models the choice of the hash function. The key must be chosen once and for all at the beginning of the game for each hash function, and the game

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 $L_1 = \text{foreach } ih \leq nh \text{ do } k \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{key};$ 
  (foreach  $i \leq n$  do
    OH( $x : \text{hashinput}$ ) := return(hash( $k, x$ )) |
    foreach  $ieq \leq neq$  do
      Oeq( $x' : \text{hashinput}, r' : \text{hashoutput}$ ) :=
        return( $r' = \text{hash}(k, x')$ ))

```

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```

 $R_1 = \text{foreach } ih \leq nh \text{ do}$ 
  (foreach  $i \leq n$  do OH( $x : \text{hashinput}$ ) :=
    find[unique]  $u \leq n$  suchthat
      defined( $x[u], r[u]$ )  $\wedge x = x[u]$ 
    then return( $r[u]$ )
    else  $r \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{hashoutput};$  return( $r$ ) |
  foreach  $ieq \leq neq$  do
    Oeq( $x' : \text{hashinput}, r' : \text{hashoutput}$ ) :=
      find[unique]  $u \leq n$  suchthat
        defined( $x[u], r[u]$ )  $\wedge x' = x[u]$ 
      then return( $r' = r[u]$ )
      else return(false)

```

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Figure 2. Random oracle model

must include a hash oracle, which allows the adversary to compute hashes. For each hash function indexed by  $ih \leq nh$ , the games  $L_1$  and  $R_1$  define two oracles, OH and Oeq:

- In  $L_1$ , OH( $x$ ) returns the image of  $x$  by  $\text{hash}(k, \cdot)$ . This oracle can be called at most  $n$  times for each hash function, and its calls are indexed by  $i \in [1, n]$ , as defined by **foreach**  $i \leq n$  **do**. We can replace this oracle with a random oracle, that is, an oracle that returns a fresh random number when it is called with a new argument, and the previously returned result when it is called with the same argument as in a previous call. Such a random oracle is implemented in  $R_1$  as follows. Like all variables defined under **foreach**  $i \leq n$ ,  $x$  is in fact an array indexed by  $i$ , so that  $x[u]$  represents the value of  $x$  in the  $u$ -th call to OH. The **find** construct looks for an index  $u$  such that  $x[u]$  and  $r[u]$  are defined, and  $x = x[u]$ , that is, the current argument of OH is the same as the argument in the  $u$ -th call, and if we find one, then we return the result of the  $u$ -th call,  $r[u]$ . Otherwise, we return a fresh random number  $r$ .
- The oracle Oeq aims to optimize the treatment of comparisons with the result of the hash function, an operation that appears frequently. In  $L_1$ , the oracle Oeq( $x', r'$ ) compares  $r'$  with  $\text{hash}(k, x')$ . In  $R_1$ , this comparison is replaced with a lookup in previous calls to the hash function. If  $x'$  was already given as argument to  $\text{hash}(k, \cdot)$ , in the  $u$ -th call ( $x' = x[u]$ ), then  $\text{hash}(k, x')$  is  $r[u]$ , so we compare  $r'$  with  $r[u]$ . Otherwise,  $x'$  was never given as argument to  $\text{hash}(k, \cdot)$ , so  $\text{hash}(k, x')$  is a fresh random number, and it is equal to  $r'$  with probability  $1/|\text{hashoutput}|$ .

We eliminate this case in  $R_1$ , so the result of the comparison  $r' = \text{hash}(k, x')$  is replaced with false and the probability of distinguishing  $L_1$  from  $R_1$  is at most  $\#\text{Oeq}/|\text{hashoutput}|$ , where  $\#\text{Oeq}$  denotes the total number of calls to Oeq.

We can notice that there exists at most one  $u$  that can satisfy the condition of **find** in OH in  $R_1$ . Indeed, suppose that  $u_1 \neq u_2$  are such that  $x[u_1], r[u_1], x[u_2], r[u_2]$  are defined and  $x = x[u_1] = x[u_2]$ . Suppose that the query OH with  $i = u_1$  is called before OH with  $i = u_2$ . (The other case is symmetric.) Thus, when executing the query OH with  $i = u_2$ ,  $x[u_1]$  and  $r[u_1]$  are defined and  $x[u_2] = x[u_1]$ , so the **find** succeeds with  $u = u_1$ , so  $r[u_2]$  will not be defined (since  $r$  is defined only in the **else** branch of the **find**). Contradiction. Therefore,  $u$  is unique. Following a similar reasoning,  $u$  is also unique in Oeq in  $R_1$ . That is why the **finds** in  $R_1$  are marked **[unique]**. Formally, the modifier **[unique]** means that, in case several choices satisfy the condition of **find**, an event NonUnique occurs and the game is aborted. As we have shown, the event NonUnique never occurs in  $R_1$ , so the modifier **[unique]** does not alter the equivalence  $L_1 \approx_{\#\text{Oeq}/|\text{hashoutput}|} R_1$ . The modifier **[unique]** allows additional transformations of **find**, which are correct only when there never exist several choices that make the condition of the **find** succeed.

The novelties with respect to [50] are the use of keyed hash functions, the oracle Oeq, and the modifier **[unique]**. We believe that using keyed hash functions leads to a better modeling of random oracles, for several reasons:

- In the random oracle model, the adversary cannot evaluate the hash function by himself, without calling the random oracle. With the key, this is natural, since the adversary does not have the key, whereas in the absence of key, this is counterintuitive: the adversary should be able to reproduce the algorithm of  $h$ .
- In the absence of key, the transformation of  $L_1$  into  $R_1$  above replaces a deterministic function  $h$  with a probabilistic one, since the results are chosen randomly in the right-hand side. The key removes this discrepancy: with the key, the hash oracle is also probabilistic in the left-hand side thanks to the choice of the key.
- The transformation of  $L_1$  into  $R_1$  above is correct only when it is applied to all occurrences of  $h$  simultaneously. In the absence of key, this has to be enforced by an additional constraint on the transformation. With the key, this is naturally enforced, since all occurrences of the key need to be encoded as calls to the oracles of  $L_1$  for the transformation to be performed.
- Finally, keyed hash functions are used in the modeling of other assumptions on hash functions, such as collision resistance. By always using keyed hash functions, we can easily change the assumption on the hash function without changing its interface.

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 $L_2 = \text{foreach } ick \leq nck \text{ do } ck \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{cipherkey};$ 
  (foreach  $ie \leq ne$  do  $\text{Oenc}(me : \text{blocksize}, ke : \text{key}) := \text{return}(\text{enc}(ck, me, ke))$  |
  foreach  $id \leq nd$  do  $\text{Odec}(md : \text{blocksize}, kd : \text{key}) := \text{return}(\text{dec}(ck, md, kd))$ )

```

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```

 $R_2 = \text{foreach } ick \leq nck \text{ do}$ 
  (foreach  $ie \leq ne$  do  $\text{Oenc}(me : \text{blocksize}, ke : \text{key}) :=$ 
    find[unique]  $j \leq ne$  suchthat defined( $me[j], ke[j], re[j]$ )  $\wedge me = me[j] \wedge ke = ke[j]$  then return( $re[j]$ )
     $\oplus k \leq ne$  suchthat defined( $rd[k], md[k], kd[k]$ )  $\wedge me = rd[k] \wedge ke = kd[k]$  then return( $md[k]$ )
    else  $re \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{blocksize}; \text{return}(re)$  |
  foreach  $id \leq nd$  do  $\text{Odec}(md : \text{blocksize}, kd : \text{key}) :=$ 
    find[unique]  $j \leq ne$  suchthat defined( $me[j], ke[j], re[j]$ )  $\wedge md = re[j] \wedge kd = ke[j]$  then return( $me[j]$ )
     $\oplus k \leq nd$  suchthat defined( $rd[k], md[k], kd[k]$ )  $\wedge md = md[k] \wedge kd = kd[k]$  then return( $rd[k]$ )
    else  $rd \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{blocksize}; \text{return}(rd)$ )

```

---

Figure 3. Ideal cipher model

Designing CryptoVerif specifications of primitives requires some expertise. That is why the specifications for most common cryptographic primitives are grouped in a reusable library. Therefore, CryptoVerif users generally do not have to design such specifications.

### C. The Ideal Cipher Model

The ideal cipher model [60] models block ciphers by saying that encryption and decryption are two random permutations, inverse of each other. This can be encoded in CryptoVerif similarly to the random oracle model: we replace encryption and decryption with lookups in previous encryption/decryption queries; if a previous query matches, we return the previous result; otherwise, we return a fresh random number. This is modeled by the equivalence  $L_2 \approx_{p_2} R_2$  where  $L_2$  and  $R_2$  are defined in Figure 3 and  $p_2 = (\#\text{Oenc} + \#\text{Odec})(\#\text{Oenc} + \#\text{Odec} - 1)/|\text{blocksize}|$ . The encryption and decryption functions map bitstrings of type *blocksize* to bitstrings of type *blocksize*; they take two keys as additional arguments: the standard encryption/decryption key of type *key*, but also a key of type *cipherkey* that models the choice of the scheme itself (like the key of the hash function in Section III-B). The games  $L_2$  and  $R_2$  define two oracles *Oenc* and *Odec*, respectively the encryption and decryption oracles. In  $L_2$ , they call the encryption and decryption functions. In  $R_2$ , they are replaced with lookups in previous encryption/decryption queries. For instance, for oracle *Oenc*, we look for a previous encryption query of the same cleartext ( $me = me[j]$ ) under the same key ( $ke = ke[j]$ ) and, if we find one, we return the same ciphertext  $re[j]$ . We also look for a previous decryption query that has returned as cleartext the cleartext to encrypt ( $me = rd[k]$ ) using the same key ( $ke = kd[k]$ ) and, if we find one, we return the corresponding ciphertext  $md[k]$ . Otherwise, we return a fresh random ciphertext  $re$ . This definition does not yield random permutations, because the random choices of  $re$  and  $rd$  may collide with each other

and with previous values of  $me$  and  $md$ . Let us consider a game  $R'_2$  obtained from  $R_2$  by excluding such collisions. By adapting the reasoning used for the random oracle model in Section III-B, we can show that, in  $R'_2$ , there never exist several choices of  $j/k$  that satisfy the conditions of the **finds** in *Oenc* and *Odec*, so these **finds** can be marked [**unique**] without modifying their behavior. The game  $L_2$  is perfectly indistinguishable from  $R'_2$ , and  $R'_2$  can be distinguished from  $R_2$  with probability at most  $p_2$  (the probability of the collisions excluded in  $R'_2$ ), so the adversary can distinguish  $L_2$  from  $R_2$  with probability at most  $p_2$ .

### D. The Computational Diffie-Hellman Assumption

A classical intractability assumption in asymmetric cryptography is the hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem: let us be given a group  $\mathbb{G}$  of prime order  $q$ , with a generator  $g$ , and two random elements  $A = g^a$  and  $B = g^b$  with  $a, b \in [1, q - 1]$ , compute  $\text{CDH}_g(A, B) = g^{ab}$ . The Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption claims that for any polynomial-time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, g, A, B) = \text{CDH}_g(A, B)]$  is negligible. More generally, we note  $\text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t)$  the maximal success probability for any adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  within time  $t$ .

This assumption can be written in CryptoVerif as follows:

```

foreach  $i \leq n$  do  $a \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; b \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z;$ 
  (OA() :=  $\text{exp}(g, a)$  | OB() :=  $\text{exp}(g, b)$  |
  foreach  $i' \leq n'$  do  $\text{ODDH}(z : G) :=$ 
     $z = \text{exp}(g, \text{mult}(a, b))$ )
 $\approx \#\text{ODDH} \times \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t + (n + \#\text{ODDH})\tau_{\text{exp}})$ 
foreach  $i \leq n$  do  $a \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; b \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z;$ 
  (OA() :=  $\text{exp}(g, a)$  | OB() :=  $\text{exp}(g, b)$  |
  foreach  $i' \leq n'$  do  $\text{ODDH}(z : G) := \text{false}$ )

```

The type  $Z$  represents  $[1, q - 1]$ , that is, the group  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ;  $\text{mult}$  is the product in that group;  $G$  represents the group  $\mathbb{G}$  without its neutral element; and  $\text{exp}$  is the exponentiation

---

```

 $L_3 = \text{foreach } ia \leq na \text{ do } a \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; ($ 
  OA() := return(exp(g, a)) |
  Oa() := return(a) |
  foreach  $iaDDH \leq naDDH$  do
    ODDHa( $m : G, j \leq nb$ ) :=
      return( $m = \text{exp}(g, \text{mult}(b[j], a))$ ) |
  foreach  $ib \leq nb$  do  $b \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; ($ 
    OB() := return(exp(g, b)) |
    Ob() := return(b) |
    foreach  $ibDDH \leq nbDDH$  do
      ODDHb( $m : G, j \leq na$ ) :=
        return( $m = \text{exp}(g, \text{mult}(a[j], b))$ )
  )
)

```

---

```

 $R_3 = \text{foreach } ia \leq na \text{ do } a \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; ($ 
  OA() := return(exp(g, a)) |
  Oa() := let  $ka : \text{bitstring} = \text{mark}$  in return(a) |
  foreach  $iaDDH \leq naDDH$  do
    ODDHa( $m : G, j \leq nb$ ) :=
      find  $u \leq nb$  suchthat defined( $kb[u], b[u]$ )
         $\wedge b[j] = b[u]$  then
        return( $m = \text{exp}(g, \text{mult}(b[j], a))$ )
      else if defined(ka) then
        return( $m = \text{exp}(g, \text{mult}(b[j], a))$ )
      else return(false) |
  foreach  $ib \leq nb$  do  $b \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} Z; ($ 
    OB() := return(exp(g, b)) |
    Ob() := let  $kb : \text{bitstring} = \text{mark}$  in return(b) |
    foreach  $ibDDH \leq nbDDH$  do
      ODDHb( $m : G, j \leq na$ ) :=
        (symmetric of ODDHa)
  )
)

```

---

Figure 4. Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption

$G \times Z \rightarrow G$ . These two games define three oracles: OA and OB return the exponentials  $g^a$  and  $g^b$  respectively, and the oracle ODDH checks whether its argument  $z$  is equal to  $g^{ab}$  in the left-hand side while it always returns false in the right-hand side. The adversary can distinguish these two games if and only if it can provide a  $z$  such that  $z = g^{ab}$ , that is, it breaks the CDH assumption. However, in CryptoVerif, this model requires that  $a$  and  $b$  be chosen one after the other under the same **foreach**: while this is true in some cryptographic schemes such as ElGamal, this is not true for most protocols: as in OEKE,  $a$  and  $b$  are chosen by different protocol participants that can each execute several sessions.

Therefore, we need a more general model, which is given by the indistinguishability between the two games presented in Figure 4. In these two games, one generates  $na$  exponents  $a$ ,  $nb$  exponents  $b$  and the adversary (any context) has access to various oracles: OA and OB that return the group elements associated to  $a$ , resp.  $b$ ; Oa and Ob that return the exponents  $a$  and  $b$  themselves; and Diffie-Hellman decisions oracles

ODDHa and ODDHb that check whether the adversary correctly solved a Diffie-Hellman problem with the above generated elements. Basically, the difference between the two games is in the answers of the decision oracles: in the first game they answer correctly, while in the second game, they answer false if the adversary did not ask for any of the two exponents. Unless the adversary can break the Diffie-Hellman problem, and then ask correct Diffie-Hellman decision queries, the two executions are perfectly indistinguishable. In more detail, in  $R_3$ , the variable  $ka$  is defined if and only if the oracle Oa has been called and thus the exponent  $a$  has been asked by the adversary. All variables and oracles defined under **foreach**  $ia \leq na$  are implicitly indexed by  $ia$ , so that  $ka[ia]$  is defined if and only if  $a[ia]$  has been asked by the adversary. The variable  $kb$  plays the same role for  $b$ . The oracle ODDHa computes the equality test  $m = g^{a[ia]b[j]}$  when  $b[j]$  has been asked by the adversary, i.e.,  $kb[j]$  is defined, or  $a[ia]$  has been asked by the adversary, i.e.  $ka[ia]$  (abbreviated  $ka$ ) is defined. Otherwise, it returns false. The condition “ $kb[j]$  is defined” is encoded as “ $kb[u]$  is defined for some  $u$  such that  $b[u] = b[j]$ ” (**defined**( $kb[u], b[u]$ )  $\wedge b[j] = b[u]$ ), because CryptoVerif allows to reference a variable  $x[\tilde{u}]$  in **defined** conditions in the right-hand side of an equivalence only when its indices  $\tilde{u}$  are a prefix of the indices looked up by **find**, so a reference to  $kb[j]$  would not be allowed. We can refer to  $b[j]$  without including it in a **defined** condition because it also occurs in the left-hand side of the equivalence, so CryptoVerif knows that it must be defined. That is why the condition **defined**( $kb[u], b[u]$ )  $\wedge b[j] = b[u]$  is accepted by CryptoVerif.

In [57, Appendix B-A], we formally prove that  $L_3 \approx_{p_3} R_3$ , that is, no adversary can distinguish the two games  $L_3$  and  $R_3$ , within time  $t$ , with advantage greater than

$$\begin{aligned}
 p_3 &= (\#\text{ODDHa} + \#\text{ODDHb}) \\
 &\times \max(1, 7.4\#\text{Oa}) \times \max(1, 7.4\#\text{Ob}) \\
 &\times \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t + (na + nb + \#\text{ODDHa} + \#\text{ODDHb})\tau_{\text{exp}}).
 \end{aligned}$$

The proof technique consists in guessing the two elements  $a$  and  $b$  that will be involved in the critical decisional Diffie-Hellman query (but with Coron’s improvement [61]), and then to guess the critical query, hence the factor  $\#\text{ODDHa} + \#\text{ODDHb}$ .

For this equivalence to be supported by CryptoVerif, we had to implement two extensions:

- Oracles ODDHa and ODDHb take as argument an array index  $j$ , which was not supported.
- In typical usages of the CDH assumption in protocols,  $g^{ab}$  is often an argument of a hash function in the random oracle model. The transformation that comes from the random oracle model, presented in Section III-B, transforms  $\text{hash}(\dots g^{ab} \dots)$  into lookups that compare  $g^{ab}$  with previous arguments of hash.

These comparisons  $m = g^{ab}$ , which occur in conditions of **find**, are themselves transformed into **find** using the CDH assumption. We therefore end up with a **find** inside the condition of a **find**, which was not supported.

In addition to the modeling of the CDH assumption itself, our model of Diffie-Hellman key agreements includes further properties, such as commutativity and injectivity of several functions. They are formally defined in [57, Appendix B-B]. We stress that our above modeling is not specific to the OEKE protocol. We have also used it to prove a signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange, and we believe that it can be used for proving many other protocols.

### E. The Protocol Itself

If we consider a general configuration with several clients and servers, each client-server pair shares a different password, and there is no other secret shared initially. Therefore, different client-server pairs have no common secret, so we can encode a single client  $U$  and a single server  $S$  that wish to talk to each other; the other clients and servers, which may be corrupted, and the interactions of  $U$  and  $S$  with other clients and servers are included in the adversary. This model supports static corruptions; dynamic corruptions and forward secrecy properties are left for future work.

The protocol model first chooses random keys  $hk0$  and  $hk1$  to model the choice of the hash functions  $h0$  (i.e.  $\mathcal{H}_0$ ) and  $h1$  (i.e.  $\mathcal{H}_1$ ) respectively and a key  $ck$  to model the choice of the ideal cipher scheme. It also randomly chooses a password  $pw$  in the type *passwd*. Then, it makes available hash oracles for  $h0$  and  $h1$ , encryption and decryption oracles, as well as oracles that represent the client and the server. As an example, we detail the code for the client:

```

foreach  $iU \leq NU$  do
  OC1() :=  $x \xleftarrow{R} Z$ ;  $X \leftarrow \text{exp}(g, x)$ ; return( $U, X$ );
  OC2( $= S, Ystar\_u : G$ ) :=  $Y\_u \leftarrow \text{dec}(ck, Ystar\_u, pw)$ ;
   $K\_u \leftarrow \text{exp}(Y\_u, x)$ ;
   $auth\_u \leftarrow h1(hk1, \text{concat}(U, S, X, Y\_u, K\_u))$ ;
   $sk\_u : hash0 \leftarrow h0(hk0, \text{concat}(U, S, X, Y\_u, K\_u))$ ;
  return( $auth\_u$ )

```

This code models  $NU$  sessions of the client, indexed by  $iU$ . Each session defines two oracles OC1 and OC2. OC1 takes no argument and returns the first message of the protocol  $U, X$  computed as specified in Figure 1. OC2 takes as argument the second message of the protocol  $S, Ystar\_u$  received by the client and returns the third one  $auth\_u$ . It also computes the shared key  $sk\_u$ . In this code,  $\text{concat}(U, S, X, Y\_u, K\_u)$  is the concatenation  $U||S||X||Y\_u||K\_u$ . These oracles are implicitly indexed by  $iU$ , so that they can be written  $OC1[iU]$ ,  $OC2[iU]$ . (This index is omitted in CryptoVerif code for readability.) The adversary can call the oracles with any index it likes in the order it likes, except that, obviously,  $OC2[iU]$  can be called

only if  $OC1[iU]$  has been called before with the same  $iU$ . This gives the adversary full control over the network.

We represent  $NS$  sessions of the server in a similar way. The  $NU$  sessions of the client and the  $NS$  sessions of the server model active attacks. Additionally, we represent  $NP$  sessions of the protocol in which the adversary just eavesdrops messages without altering them. In order to represent such sessions, we simply compute and output their transcript. They model passive attacks. Since we are considering dictionary attacks against a password-authenticated key exchange protocol, it is important to distinguish passive sessions/attacks from active ones against the honest players.

### F. Security Properties

Our goal is to prove that OEKE is a secure key exchange that provides unilateral (explicit) authentication. (OEKE guarantees client authentication but not server authentication.) To do that, we follow the ideas of [62, Section 7.2]: instead of proving semantic security of the key and authentication, we prove secrecy of the key on the client side and a slightly stronger authentication property. This technique avoids the burden of considering partnering when proving secrecy of the key and still implies authenticated key exchange [62, Proposition 4]: intuitively, authentication guarantees that a key of the server is also a key of a client. Authentication is modeled by correspondence properties [63] of the form “if some event occurs, then some other event occurred”. There are still two differences with respect to [62]:

- [62] considers mutual authentication, while we consider unilateral authentication, so we remove the correspondence that guaranteed authentication of the server.
- In [62], each protocol participant may interact with honest participants ( $U$  and  $S$  here) but also with dishonest participants, and in the latter situation, the exchanged key is published when the participant accepts. As mentioned in Section III-E, in OEKE, we need not code explicitly for  $U$  and  $S$  interacting with other clients and servers, so the output of the exchanged key disappears.

Taking into account these points, we add events to record that the participants accept or terminate:

- **event**  $\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar\_u, auth\_u, sk\_u)$  when the client accepts (line “ $\text{accept} \leftarrow \text{true}$ ” of the client in Figure 1, that is, before the last line in the code of Section III-E).
- **event**  $\text{termS}(U, X\_s, S, Ystar, auth\_s, sk\_s)$  when the server terminates (line “ $\text{terminate} \leftarrow \text{true}$ ” of the server in Figure 1).

and we prove that the resulting process preserves the secrecy of  $sk\_u$  and satisfies the correspondences

$$\text{inj-event}(\text{termS}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)) \Rightarrow \text{inj-event}(\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)) \quad (1)$$

$$\text{event}(\text{termS}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)) \wedge \text{event}(\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k')) \Rightarrow k = k' \quad (2)$$



with public variables  $\{sk_u\}$ . A variant of [62, Proposition 4] allows us to conclude one-way authenticated key exchange. Next, we define secrecy and correspondences.

Intuitively, the secrecy of  $sk_u$  means that the keys  $sk_u$  of all sessions of the client are indistinguishable from independent random keys. Formally, secrecy is defined as follows:

**Definition 2 (Secrecy)** Assume that the variable  $x$  of type  $T$  is defined in  $G$  under a single **foreach**  $i \leq n$ . The game  $G$  preserves the secrecy of  $x$  up to probability  $p$  when, for all contexts  $C$  acceptable for  $G \mid R_x$  without public variables that do not contain  $S$  and  $\bar{S}$ ,  $\Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : \bar{S}] \leq p(C)$  where

$$\begin{aligned}
R_x = O_0() &:= b \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} \text{bool}; \text{return}; \\
&(\text{foreach } i' \leq n' \text{ do } O(u : [1, n]) := \\
&\quad \text{if defined}(x[u]) \text{ then} \\
&\quad \quad \text{if } b \text{ then return}(x[u]) \text{ else} \\
&\quad \quad \text{find } u' \leq n' \text{ suchthat defined}(y[u'], u[u']) \wedge \\
&\quad \quad \quad u[u'] = u \text{ then return}(y[u']) \text{ else} \\
&\quad \quad y \stackrel{R}{\leftarrow} T; \text{return}(y) \\
| O'(b' : \text{bool}) &:= \text{if } b = b' \text{ then event } S; \text{abort} \\
&\quad \quad \text{else event } \bar{S}; \text{abort}
\end{aligned}$$

$O_0, O, O', b, b', u, u', y, S$ , and  $\bar{S}$  do not occur in  $G$ .

We define the secrecy of  $x$  with the Real-or-Random model of [64]: in  $R_x$ , we choose a random bit  $b$ , and provide the oracle  $O$  that the adversary can use to perform several test queries on  $x[u]$ : if  $b = 1$ , the test query returns  $x[u]$ ; if  $b = 0$ , it returns a random value  $y$  (the same value if the same query  $x[u]$  is asked twice). Finally, the adversary should guess the bit  $b$ : it calls oracle  $O'$  with its guess  $b'$  and, if the guess is correct, then event  $S$  is executed, and otherwise, event  $\bar{S}$  is executed. The probability of getting some information on the secret is the difference between the probability of  $S$  and the probability of  $\bar{S}$ . (When the game always runs oracle  $O'$ , we have  $\Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : \bar{S}] = 1 - \Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : S]$ , so the advantage of the adversary is  $\Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : \bar{S}] = 2\Pr[C[G \mid R_x] : S] - 1$ , which is a more standard formula.) As shown in [64], the Real-or-Random model is stronger than the Find-Then-Guess model used in [55], which allows a single test query and several reveal queries. (Reveal queries always return the real  $x[u]$ .)

The correspondence (1) means that each execution of event  $\text{termS}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)$  corresponds to a distinct execution of event  $\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)$ ; in other words, each session of the server that accepts with transcript  $U, X, S, Ystar, a$  and shared key  $k$  corresponds to a distinct session of the client that accepts with the same transcript and same key. It corresponds to the authentication of the client. The keyword **inj-event** is used in CryptoVerif to require injective correspondences, that is,  $\text{acceptU}$  has been executed at least as many times

as  $\text{termS}$ , and not only once. The correspondence (2) means that when events  $\text{termS}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)$  and  $\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k')$  have been executed,  $k = k'$ , that is, if a client and a server have the same transcript, then they share the same key. These correspondences are proved “with public variables  $\{sk_u\}$ ”, that is, they hold even when the adversary is allowed to access  $sk_u$  directly. Formally, we write  $\mathcal{E} \vdash \psi \Rightarrow \varphi$  when the sequence of events  $\mathcal{E}$  satisfies the correspondence  $\psi \Rightarrow \varphi$ . (This is formally defined in [62].) For instance,  $\mathcal{E} \vdash \text{inj-event}(\text{termS}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k)) \Rightarrow \text{inj-event}(\text{acceptU}(U, X, S, Ystar, a, k))$  if and only if, for each event  $\text{acceptU}(\dots)$  in  $\mathcal{E}$ , there is a distinct event  $\text{termS}(\dots)$  in  $\mathcal{E}$  with the same arguments as the event  $\text{acceptU}(\dots)$ .

**Definition 3 (Correspondence)** The game  $G$  satisfies the correspondence  $\psi \Rightarrow \varphi$  with public variables  $V$  up to probability  $p$  if and only if, for all contexts  $C$  acceptable for  $G$  with public variables  $V$  that do not contain events,  $\Pr[C[Q] : D] \leq p(C)$ , where  $D(\mathcal{E}, a) = (\mathcal{E} \not\vdash \psi \Rightarrow \varphi)$ .

#### IV. PROVING OEKE IN CRYPTOVERIF

In the previous section, we have presented the formalization of the protocol given as input to CryptoVerif. In this section, we explain how CryptoVerif proceeds with the proof. Additional details can be found in [57, Appendix F]. Some parts of the proof are automatic, some are guided by the user. The commands for guiding CryptoVerif can be given interactively, which allows one to see the current game and understand what should be done next, or in a proof  $\{\dots\}$  declaration in the CryptoVerif input file, so that CryptoVerif can then run on its own. The input file presented at <http://www.cryptoverif.ens.fr/OEKE/> includes such a declaration. We stress that, even with manual guidance, all game transformations are verified by CryptoVerif, so that one cannot perform an incorrect proof.

##### A. Applying Shoup’s Lemma

The first step of the proof is to introduce the events Auth and Encrypt, which correspond to cases in which the adversary succeeds in testing a password and were also used in the manual proof of [55].

By Shoup’s lemma [43], if  $G'$  is obtained from  $G$  by inserting an event  $e$  and modifying the code executed after  $e$ , the probability of distinguishing  $G'$  from  $G$  is bounded by the probability of executing  $e$ : for all contexts  $C$  acceptable for  $G$  and  $G'$  (with any public variables) and all distinguishers  $D$ ,  $|\Pr[C[G] : D] - \Pr[C[G'] : D]| \leq \Pr[C[G'] : e]$ . Hence,  $\Pr[C[G] : D] \leq \Pr[C[G'] : e] + \Pr[C[G'] : D]$ . We improve over this computation of probabilities by considering  $e$  and  $D$  simultaneously instead of making the sum of the two probabilities:  $\Pr[C[G] : D] \leq \Pr[C[G'] : D \vee e]$ .

**Lemma 1** Let  $C$  be a context acceptable for  $G$  and  $G'$  with public variables  $V$ .

- 1) If  $G'$  differs from  $G$  only when  $G'$  executes event  $e$ , then  $\Pr[C[G] : D] \leq \Pr[C[G'] : D \vee e]$ .
- 2) If  $G$  differs from  $G'$  only when  $G$  executes event NonUnique and  $D = (D_0 \wedge \neg \text{NonUnique}) \vee e_1 \vee \dots \vee e_n$  where we abort just after executing events  $e_1, \dots, e_n$ , then  $\Pr[C[G] : D] \leq \Pr[C[G'] : D]$ .
- 3) If  $G \approx_p^V G'$ , then  $\Pr[C[G] : D] \leq p(C, t_D) + \Pr[C[G'] : D]$ .
- 4)  $\Pr[C[G] : D \vee D'] \leq \Pr[C[G] : D] + \Pr[C[G] : D']$ .

This lemma, and Lemma 2 below, are proved in [57, Appendix C]. In order to bound the probability that a distinguisher  $D_0$  returns true for some game  $G_0$ , we consider any context  $C$  acceptable for  $G_0$  with public variables  $V$  and that does not contain events, and bound  $\Pr[C[G_0] : D_0 \wedge \neg \text{NonUnique}]$  which is equal to  $\Pr[C[G_0] : D_0]$  because no **find[unique]** occurs in the initial game. For each game transformation, we assume that the introduced variables are fresh, so that  $C$  remains acceptable for all games of the sequence. We can then apply Lemma 1 for each game transformation. Points 1, 2, and 3 of this lemma allow us to handle several events simultaneously, as long as the proof uses the same sequence of games to bound their probabilities. Point 2 is useful for transformations that rely on the uniqueness of the values that satisfy the conditions of **find**: these transformations preserve the behavior of the game when  $G$  does not execute event NonUnique. The distinguisher  $D$  is always of the desired form  $(D_0 \wedge \neg \text{NonUnique}) \vee e_1 \vee \dots \vee e_n$  because we start from  $D_0 \wedge \neg \text{NonUnique}$  and add events introduced by Shoup's lemma using point 1; we abort immediately after these events. When the proof uses different sequences of games to bound the probabilities of events, we use point 4 of the lemma to bound each probability separately and compute the sum. The standard computation of probabilities corresponds to always applying point 4.

For example, suppose that we want to bound the probability of event  $e_0$  in  $G_0$ ,  $G_1$  differs from  $G_0$  only when  $G_1$  executes event  $e$ ,  $G_1 \approx_p G_2$ , and  $G_2$  executes neither  $e_0$  nor  $e$ . Suppose for simplicity that no **find[unique]** occurs, so that NonUnique never occurs. Lemma 1 yields  $\Pr[C[G_0] : e_0] \leq \Pr[C[G_1] : e_0 \vee e] \leq p(C, t_{e_0 \vee e}) + \Pr[C[G_2] : e_0 \vee e] = p(C, t_{e_0 \vee e})$ . The standard computation of probabilities yields  $\Pr[C[G_0] : e_0] \leq \Pr[C[G_1] : e_0] + \Pr[C[G_1] : e] \leq p(C, t_{e_0}) + p(C, t_e)$ . The runtime  $t_D$  of  $D$  is approximately the same for  $e_0$ ,  $e$ , and  $e_0 \vee e$ , so  $\Pr[C[G_0] : e_0] \leq p(C, t_D)$  by Lemma 1, while  $\Pr[C[G_0] : e_0] \leq 2p(C, t_D)$  by the standard computation, so we have gained a factor 2.

For secrecy, the advantage  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G | R_x] : \bar{S}]$  introduces a factor 2 in the probability: if  $G \approx_p^{\{x\}} G'$ , then  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G | R_x] : \bar{S}] \leq 2p(C[[ | R_x], t_S] + (\Pr[C[G' | R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G' | R_x] : \bar{S}]))$ , since

$t_S = t_{\bar{S}}$ . The next lemma avoids this factor 2 for probabilities of events:

**Lemma 2** Let  $C$  be a context acceptable for  $G$  and  $G'$  with public variables  $V$ . Let the distinguishers  $D, D'$  be disjunctions of events  $e_1 \vee \dots \vee e_n$  such that we abort just after executing each  $e_i$ . Let  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) = \Pr[C[G | R_x] : S \vee D] - \Pr[C[G | R_x] : \bar{S} \vee \text{NonUnique}]$ .

- 1) If  $G'$  differs from  $G$  only when  $G'$  executes event  $e$  and we abort just after executing  $e$ , then  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) \leq \text{Adv}_{G'}^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D \vee e)$ .
- 2) If  $G$  differs from  $G'$  only when  $G$  executes NonUnique, then  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) \leq \text{Adv}_{G'}^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D)$ .
- 3) If  $G \approx_p^V G'$ , then  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) \leq 2p(C[[ | R_x], t] + \text{Adv}_{G'}^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D)$  where  $t = \max(t_{S \vee D}, t_{\bar{S} \vee \text{NonUnique}})$ .
- 4)  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D \vee D') \leq \text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) + \Pr[C[G | R_x] : D']$ .
- 5) If CryptoVerif proves the secrecy of  $x$  in game  $G$ , then  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : S] = \Pr[C[G | R_x] : \bar{S}]$ , so  $\text{Adv}_G^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, D) \leq \Pr[C[G | R_x] : D]$ .

In order to prove secrecy of  $x$  in the initial game  $G_0$ , we bound  $\Pr[C[G_0 | R_x] : S] - \Pr[C[G_0 | R_x] : \bar{S}] = \text{Adv}_{G_0}^{\text{Secrecy}}(C, \text{false})$ , by applying Lemma 2 for each game transformation. When we apply points 4 and 5 of this lemma, we use bounds on the probabilities of events,  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : D']$  and  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : D]$  respectively, which can be established using Lemma 1. (They can be written  $\Pr[C[G | R_x] : (\text{false} \wedge \neg \text{NonUnique}) \vee D]$ , so they are of the form required by point 2 of Lemma 1.) These probabilities are not multiplied by 2, so we improve over the standard computation of probabilities for secrecy.

These improvements are implemented in CryptoVerif but also apply to manual proofs. For instance, by applying this result to the manual proof of OEKE [55], we obtain that the probability for any adversary to make a server instance accept with no terminating client partner is bounded by

$$\frac{N_U + N_S}{N} + q_h \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + p'_{\text{coll}}$$

$$\text{with } p'_{\text{coll}} = \frac{(2q_e + 2N_U + 3N_S + 3N_P)^2}{2(q-1)} + \frac{q_h^2 + 2N_S}{2^{l_1+1}}$$

and that no adversary can distinguish the session key from a random key with advantage greater than

$$\frac{N_U + N_S}{N} + q_h \text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + 2p'_{\text{coll}}$$

with the notations of Section II. For both properties, the first term of the probability  $\frac{N_U + N_S}{N}$  shows that the adversary can test at most one password for each interaction with the client or the server, which is the optimal result, while the standard evaluation of probabilities given in Section II yields  $\frac{N_U + 2N_S}{N}$  for the first property and  $\frac{2N_U + 4N_S}{N}$  for the second

one. Similar improvements could also be obtained for the AuthA protocol [55, Section 4.1] and for the forward secrecy property [55, Appendix D].

1) *Inserting events*: In order to introduce events, we have implemented a new game transformation in CryptoVerif: `insert_event e o` inserts **event**  $e$ ; **abort** at program point  $o$ . The program point  $o$  is an integer, which can be determined using the command `show_game occ`: this command displays the current game with the corresponding label  $\{o\}$  at each program point. The command `show_game occ` also allows one to inspect the game, for instance to know the names of fresh variables created by CryptoVerif during previous transformations. Program points and variable names may depend on the version of CryptoVerif; this paper uses CryptoVerif 1.14. CryptoVerif cannot guess where events should be introduced, so the command `insert_event` must be manually given to the tool.

We have also defined a command `insert o ins` which adds instruction  $ins$  at the program point  $o$ . The instruction  $ins$  can for instance be a test, in which case all branches of the test will be copies of the code that follows program point  $o$  (so that the semantics of the game is unchanged). It can also be an assignment or a random generation of a fresh variable. In all cases, CryptoVerif checks that this instruction preserves the semantics of the game, and rejects it with an error message if it does not.

2) *Transformations for h1*: At the beginning of the proof, we transform the game using the random oracle assumption for h1. This transformation helps us make a program point appear at which we will next insert an event. Before actually performing this transformation, we first introduce a case distinction that leads to a simpler game after applying the random oracle assumption:

- By command `insert 261 “let concat( $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ ) =  $h1x$  in”`, we introduce a **let** in the hash oracle for h1. As the result, this hash oracle becomes `OH1( $h1x$  : bitstring) := let concat( $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ ) =  $h1x$  in return(h1( $hk1, h1x$ )) else return(h1( $hk1, h1x$ ))`: the meaning of this **let** construct is that, if  $h1x$  is of the form `concat( $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ )`, then the **in** branch is taken with  $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$  bound to their value (which is uniquely determined because the length of the fields of the concatenation is fixed); otherwise, the **else** branch is taken. Thus, we distinguish cases depending on whether  $h1x$  is of the form `concat(...)` or not. In the next transformation, which applies the random oracle assumption to h1, we are going to replace calls to h1 with lookups in the previous queries to h1. All queries to h1 in the protocol have an argument of the form `concat( $x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5'$ )`. When comparing this query to a query in the hash oracle, the comparison  $h1x = \text{concat}(x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5')$  can then be simplified as follows:

- If `h1( $h1x$ )` was computed in the **in** branch

of the introduced **let**, the comparison becomes `concat( $x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5$ ) = concat( $x_1', x_2', x_3', x_4', x_5'$ )`, that is,  $x_1 = x_1' \wedge \dots \wedge x_5 = x_5'$ .

- If `h1( $h1x$ )` was computed in the **else** branch of this **let**, the comparison becomes false, because  $h1x$  cannot be of the form `concat(...)`, since the **in** branch would have been taken in that case.

- `crypto rom(h1)` applies the equivalence  $L_1 \approx_{p_1} R_1$  of Figure 2, designated by `rom` for Random Oracle Model, to the hash function h1: it transforms calls to h1 into lookups in the previous queries to h1, as outlined in Section III-B.

3) *Event Auth*: Next, we introduce event Auth: This event corresponds to the case in which the group element  $X$  received by the server (denoted  $X\_s$ ) does not come from the client, the authenticator  $Auth$  received by the server (denoted  $auth\_s$ ) comes from a hash query by the adversary, and authentication still succeeds. To be able to introduce this event, we first make the program point appear, at which this event will be inserted:

- `insert 179 “find  $j \leq NU$  suchthat defined( $X[j]$ )  $\wedge X[j] = X\_s$  then”` inserts a test after receiving the authenticator in the server, to distinguish the case in which  $X\_s$  comes from the client ( $X\_s = X[j]$  for some  $j$ ).
- `insert 341 “find  $jh \leq qH1$  suchthat defined( $x1[jh], x2[jh], x3[jh], x4[jh], hash_1[jh]$ )  $\wedge (U = x1[jh]) \wedge (S = x2[jh]) \wedge (X\_s = x3[jh]) \wedge (Y = x4[jh]) \wedge (auth\_s = hash_1[jh])$  then”` inserts a test, in the **else** branch of the previous one, to detect when authentication succeeds with an authenticator  $auth\_s$  that comes from a hash query made by the adversary. The result of that hash query<sup>2</sup> is  $hash_1[jh]$  and its arguments are  $x1[jh], \dots, x5[jh]$ . We purposely do not test that the 5-th argument of the hash query is the expected one. This avoids computing an exponentiation  $\exp(X\_s, y)$  where  $X\_s$  comes from the adversary and  $y$  is a secret exponent, thus removing a query to Ob in the CDH equivalence.
- `insert_event Auth 384` inserts the event itself in the **then** branch of the previous test.
- Finally, `simplify` cleans up the obtained game. The **else** branch of the `find  $jh$`  inserted above is removed: in that branch, authentication always fails so the protocol executes nothing.

4) *Event Encrypt*: Next, we introduce the event Encrypt: This event corresponds to the case in which the value  $Y^*$  received by the client (denoted  $Ystar\_u$ ) comes from an encryption query of the adversary under the correct password. As above, we have to prepare this insertion:

- `crypto icm(enc)` applies the equivalence that represents the Ideal Cipher Model, designated by `icm`, to

<sup>2</sup>In CryptoVerif 1.14, the variable  $hash_1$  is in fact named `@11_r_134`. We have renamed it to  $hash_1$  for readability.

the encryption scheme `enc`: it replaces calls to encryption/decryption with lookups in previous queries, as outlined in Section III-C.

- `insert_event Encrypt 633` inserts the event `Encrypt` when the lookup in previous encryption/decryption queries that comes from the decryption of `Ystar_u` succeeds with an encryption query of the adversary.

5) *Transformations for h0*: We proceed for `h0` similarly to what we did for `h1` at the beginning of the proof:

- `insert 1251 “let concat(x01, x02, x03, x04, x05) = h0x in”` distinguishes cases depending on whether the argument `h0x` of the hash oracle for `h0` is of the form `concat(...)` or not.
- `crypto rom(h0)` applies the random oracle assumption to `h0` (Section III-B).

### B. Automatic Steps

After distinguishing cases for `h0` and `h1` and introducing events, we can use the automatic proof strategy of `CryptoVerif`, by command `auto`. Basically, this strategy consists in applying all possible cryptographic transformations (coming from equivalences  $L \approx_p R$ ) and simplifying the game after each such transformation. When the transformations fail, they advise syntactic transformations that could make them succeed; these transformations are executed and the cryptographic transformation is then retried [49, Section 5].

More precisely, in our case, `CryptoVerif` renames several variables and simplifies terms, in order to be able to apply the CDH assumption (Section III-D). After these transformations, no automatic step can be performed, so the automatic proof stops.

### C. Reorganizing Random Number Generations

We end up in a situation in which random values for `Y` are generated, but are used only in comparisons with previous queries. We would like to delay or remove these random number generations. This situation occurs at three places:

- When `Y_u` (the value of `Y` in the client) is a fresh random group element, `auth_u` and `K_u` are also fresh random values, independently of the value of `Y_u`, so `Y_u` is used only in comparisons with previous encryption/decryption queries.
- The value of `Y` in the passive eavesdroppings, `Yp`, is a fresh random group element; the encryption `Y*` of `Y` is thus also a fresh random group element by the ideal cipher model, and the hash queries return a random value independently of the value of `Yp`, so `Yp` is also used only in comparisons with previous encryption/decryption queries.
- The value of `Y` in the server is also a fresh random group element; it is used in the test that decides whether to execute event `Auth` and in comparisons with previous encryption/decryption queries.

We have implemented new game transformations in `CryptoVerif`, detailed in [57, Appendix E], to handle this situation:

- `move_array X` delays the generation of a random value `X` until the point at which it is first used.
- `merge_arrays x11 ... x1n, ..., xm1 ... xmn` merges the variables  $x_{j1}, \dots, x_{jn}$  into a single variable  $x_{j1}$  for each  $j \leq m$ . Each variable  $x_{jk}$  must have a single definition. For each  $j \leq n$ , the variables  $x_{j1}, \dots, x_{jn}$  must have the same type and indices of the same type. They must not be defined for the same value of their indices (that is,  $x_{jk}$  and  $x_{jk'}$  must be defined in different branches of `if` or `find` when  $k \neq k'$ ), so that they can be merged into a single array.
- `merge_branches` merges branches of `if` and `find` when they execute the same code.

Using these transformations, we can eliminate the random number generations for `Y` as outlined at the beginning of this section. We consider the three generations of `Y` in turn. For each of these generations, we first apply `move_array` to the corresponding variable, to delay its generation. For OEKE, this has the effect of generating it in the decryption oracle available to the adversary. So, in this oracle, we end up with two possibilities of generating a fresh result, the one that comes from the delayed generation of `Y`, say `Y'`, and the one that corresponds to the situation in which the query is really a fresh decryption query, say `Yd`. We would like to merge these two cases by `merge_branches`. However, `merge_branches` does not succeed directly: we first need to merge the two variables `Yd` and `Y'` into a single variable by `merge_arrays Yd Y'`, then we can apply `merge_branches`. In the case of the value of `Y` in the server, we additionally need to rewrite the condition that triggers the event `Auth` for `merge_branches` to succeed. This is done by a few manual commands, checked correct by `CryptoVerif`. In this process, the event `Auth` is renamed into `Auth2`.

### D. The Final Computation of Probabilities

In the obtained game, the events `Auth2` and `Encrypt` are guarded by the following conditions (variables have been renamed for readability):

```
(foreach iU ≤ NU do ...
  find[unique] je ≤ qE suchthat defined(re[je], ke[je]) ∧
  Ystar_u = re[je] ∧ pw = ke[je] then event Encrypt ...
) | (foreach iS ≤ NS do ...
  find jh' ≤ qH1, jd ≤ qD suchthat defined(x1[jh'],
  x2[jh'], x3[jh'], x4[jh'], hash1[jh'], m[jd], kd[jd],
  rd[jd]) ∧ m[jd] = Ystar ∧ U = x1[jh'] ∧
  S = x2[jh'] ∧ X_s = x3[jh'] ∧ rd[jd] = x4[jh'] ∧
  auth_s = hash1[jh'] ∧ kd[jd] = pw then
  event Auth2 ...) | ...
```

So, in order to bound the probabilities of these events, we just have to eliminate collisions between the password `pw` and the encryption and decryption keys, `ke[je]` and `kd[jd]`.

This is done by the command `simplify coll_elim pw`. The collisions on  $pw$  are not eliminated automatically by CryptoVerif because the type  $passwd$  of  $pw$  is declared with annotation **password**. This annotation allows manual elimination of collisions but prevents automatic elimination of collisions. For passwords, whose set is not very large, the automatic elimination of collisions would yield a too large probability bound.

We have to evaluate the probability of these collisions. A naive evaluation considers that one makes at most  $NU \times qE$  comparisons  $pw = ke[je]$  (there are  $NU$  sessions of the client and the condition of **find** is evaluated at most  $qE$  times) and similarly at most  $NS \times qH1 \times qD$  comparisons  $kd[jd] = pw$ , which yields the probability  $(NU \times qE + NS \times qH1 \times qD)/|passwd|$ . A slightly more clever way is to notice that  $pw = ke[je]$  contains as only index  $je \leq qE$ , so at most  $qE$  distinct comparisons are performed (there are at most  $qE$  distinct encryption keys), and similarly at most  $qD$  distinct comparisons  $kd[jd] = pw$ , which yields the probability  $(qE + qD)/|passwd|$ . This is not satisfactory yet, because the encryption and decryption queries can be performed by the adversary without interacting with the protocol, so  $qE$  and  $qD$  can be large. So we have extended CryptoVerif to improve this probability bound. We start from the most naive evaluation  $NU \times qE$  and try to eliminate each factor. We can eliminate  $NU$  as shown above, but we can also eliminate  $qE$ : for each session of the client,  $Ystar\_u$  is fixed; since  $Ystar\_u = re[je]$ ,  $re[je]$  is also fixed. By eliminating collisions on  $re$ , there is a unique  $je$  that can make the comparison  $Ystar\_u = re[je]$  succeed, so a unique  $je$  for which the comparison  $pw = ke[je]$  is performed. Similarly, the comparison  $kd[jd] = pw$  is performed at most once for each session of the server. Thus we obtain the probability  $(NU + NS)/|passwd|$ . To know which factors we should preferably eliminate, we annotate  $qE$  and  $qD$  with **noninteractive**, which means that the adversary can perform the corresponding queries without interacting with the protocol, so  $qE$  and  $qD$  will typically be larger than other bounds. Therefore, the bound  $(NU + NS)/|passwd|$  is better than  $(qE + qD)/|passwd|$ , so CryptoVerif returns the former.

CryptoVerif then concludes that the events Encrypt and Auth2 can be executed with probability at most  $(NU + NS)/|passwd|$  in the last game. Finally, CryptoVerif shows that OEKE preserves the secrecy of  $sk\_u$  up to probability

$$\frac{NS + NU}{|passwd|} + (2qH0 + 3qH1)\text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + 2p''_{\text{coll}}$$

and satisfies the correspondences (1) and (2) with public variables  $\{sk\_u\}$  up to probability

$$\frac{NS + NU}{|passwd|} + (4qH0 + 6qH1)\text{Succ}_{\mathbb{G}}^{\text{cdh}}(t') + p''_{\text{coll}}$$

where  $t' = t + (2qH0 + 3qH1 + qD + 2NU + 2NP + NS)\tau_{\text{exp}}$  and the terms in  $p''_{\text{coll}}$  come from elimination of collisions

between hashes and between group elements:  $p''_{\text{coll}} \leq (NS + NU + qH1 \times NU + qH1^2)/|hash1| + (qD \times NU \times NP + NU^2 \times NP + qD \times NU \times NS + NU^2 \times NS + 2qH1 \times NP + 4qE \times NP + 4qE \times NS + 4NP^2 + 3NS^2 + 2.5qD^2 + 9NP \times NU + 9NU \times NS + 7NS \times qD + 6NP \times qD + 10NS \times NP + 12.5NU^2 + 2qD \times qE + qH1 \times NU + 2qH0 \times NU + 4NU \times qD + 3NU \times qE + 1.5qE^2 + 6NS + 10NU)/|G|$ . The main term in this probability is  $(NS + NU)/|passwd|$ : the adversary can test at most one password per session with the client or the server (active attack), which is the best bound we can hope. In contrast, [55] yields a bound of at most 4 passwords per session. In Section IV-A, by applying our improvement of the computation of probabilities to the manual proof of [55], we obtained the same first term as CryptoVerif, and even better second and third terms. CryptoVerif obtains a second term larger than in Section IV-A because it counts several Diffie-Hellman queries, which in fact correspond to the same query, and because the CDH assumption does not benefit from the improvement of Lemma 2, points 4 and 5: the probability of breaking CDH is taken into account using Lemma 2, point 3, so it is multiplied by 2.

## V. CONCLUSION

We have proved the security of OEKE using the tool CryptoVerif. This proof provides additional confidence that the protocol is correct. Moreover, we have improved the probability bound given in [55]: we have shown that the adversary can test at most one password per session with the client or with the server, which is the optimal result. OEKE is a non-trivial case study, which is interesting on its own. It was also an opportunity to implement many extensions to CryptoVerif, which will be useful for proving many other protocols. We have already used the model of CDH to prove a signed Diffie-Hellman protocol. We plan to apply these extensions to other protocols, such as IKEv2 or SSH, which also rely on Diffie-Hellman. Our improvement of the computation of probabilities is also of general interest, and applies to manual proofs as well as CryptoVerif proofs.

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