A Computationally Sound Automatic Prover for Cryptographic Protocols

Bruno Blanchet
CNRS, École Normale Supérieure, Paris

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Introduction

Two approaches for the automatic proof of cryptographic protocols in a computational model:

- **Indirect approach:**
  1) Make a Dolev-Yao proof.
  2) Use a theorem that shows the soundness of the Dolev-Yao approach with respect to the computational model.
  Pioneered by Abadi and Rogaway; currently attracts much attention.

- **Direct approach:**
  Design automatic tools for proving protocols in a computational model.
  Approach pioneered by Laud.
Advantages and drawbacks

The indirect approach allows more reuse of previous work, but it has limitations:

- **Hypotheses** have to be added to make sure that the computational and Dolev-Yao models coincide.

- The **allowed cryptographic primitives** are often limited, and only ideal, not very practical primitives can be used.

- Using the Dolev-Yao model is actually a (big) **detour**; The computational definitions of primitives fit the computational security properties to prove. They do not fit the Dolev-Yao model.

We decided to focus on the direct approach.
An automatic prover

Work in progress!

We have implemented an automatic prover:

- proves secrecy.

- handles macs (message authentication codes) and stream ciphers (plus a few other variants of symmetric encryption).

- works for \( N \) sessions (polynomial in the security parameter), with an active adversary.

Extensions to other security properties and primitives are obviously planned.
Produced proofs

As in Shoup’s method, the proof is a sequence of games:

- The first game is the real protocol.

- One goes from one game to the next by syntactic transformations or by applying the definition of security of a cryptographic primitive. The difference of probability between consecutive games is negligible.

- The last game is “ideal”: the security property can be read directly on it. (The advantage of the adversary is 0 for this game.)

A game is formalized as an extension of the pi calculus with function symbols and arrays.
Process calculus for games: terms

Essentially extends the calculus of [Lincoln, Mitchell, Mitchell, Scedrov] with arrays.

\[
M ::= \quad \text{terms} \\
\quad x, y, z, x[M_1, \ldots, M_n] \quad \text{variable} \\
\quad f(M_1, \ldots, M_n) \quad \text{function application} \\
\quad M = M' \quad \text{equality test} \\
\quad \text{if } M \text{ then } M_1 \text{ else } M_2 \quad \text{test} \\
\quad \text{find } j \leq N \text{ such that defined}(x[j], \ldots) \&\& M \text{ then } M_1 \text{ else } M_2 \quad \text{array lookup} \\
\quad \text{let } x = M \text{ in } M' \quad \text{assignment}
\]
Process calculus for games: processes

\[ P ::= \]
\begin{align*}
0 & \quad \text{process} \\
P | P' & \quad \text{nil} \\
\!^i P & \quad \text{parallel composition} \\
N P & \quad \text{replication } N \text{ times} \\
c(x : T); P & \quad \text{input} \\
c(M); P & \quad \text{output} \\
new x : T; P & \quad \text{random number generation (uniform)} \\
let x = M in P & \quad \text{assignment} \\
if M \text{ then } P \text{ else } P' & \quad \text{conditional} \\
\text{find } j \leq N \text{ such that defined}(x[j], \ldots) \text{ && } M \text{ then } P \text{ else } P' & \quad \text{array lookup}
\end{align*}
Arrays

Arrays replace lists often used in cryptographic proofs.

A variable defined under a replication is implicitly an array:

\[ !^{i \leq N} \text{let } x = M \text{ in } \ldots \]

in fact defines \( x[i] \), for \( i \) in \( 1, \ldots, N \). Under \( !^{i \leq N} \), we write \( x \) for \( x[i] \).

Only variables with the current indexes can be assigned.

Variables may be defined at several places, but only one definition can be executed for the same indexes.

(\( if \ldots then \text{let } x = M \text{ in } P \text{ else let } x = M' \text{ in } P' \text{ is ok} \))
find performs an array lookup:

\[ \forall i \leq N \text{ let } x = M \text{ in } P \]
\[ \mid \forall i' \leq N' (y : T) \text{ find } j \leq N \text{ suchthat } \text{defined}(x[j]) \land y = x[j] \text{ then } \ldots \]

Note that find is here used outside the scope of x.

This is the only way of getting access to values of variables in other sessions.

When several sessions satisfy the condition of the find, the returned index is chosen randomly, with uniform probability.
MACs: security definition

A mac takes as input a message and a secret key $mac(m, k)$. It comes with a checking function $check$ such that

$$check(m, k, mac(m, k)) = true$$

A mac guarantees the integrity and authenticity of the message because only someone who knows the secret key can build the mac.

More formally, an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that has oracle access to $mac$ and $check$ has a negligible probability to forge a mac:

$$\Pr[check(m, k, t) \mid k \xleftarrow{\$} kgen; (m, t) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{mac}(\cdot, k), \text{check}(\cdot, k, \cdot)}]$$

is negligible when the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has not called the $mac$ oracle on message $m$. 
**MACs: intuitive implementation**

By the previous definition, the adversary has a negligible probability of forging a correct mac.

So when checking a mac with `check(m, k, t)` and `k` is secret, the check can succeed only if `m` is in the list (array) of messages whose `mac` has been computed by the protocol.

So we can replace a check with an array lookup:
if the call to `mac` is `mac(x, k)`, we replace `check(m, k, t)` with

\[
\text{find } j \leq N \text{ such that defined}(x[j]) \&\& \\
(m = x[j]) \&\& \text{check}(m, k, t) \text{ then true else false}
\]

Furthermore, we use primed function symbols after the transformation, so that it is not done again.
MACs: formal implementation

\[ \text{check}(m, k\text{gen}(r), \text{mac}(m, k\text{gen}(r))) = \text{true} \]

new \( r : \text{keyseed;}( \)
\[
(x : \text{bitstring}) \rightarrow_N \text{mac}(x, k\text{gen}(r)), \\
(m : \text{bitstring}, t : \text{macstring}) \rightarrow_N \text{check}(m, k\text{gen}(r), t))
\]

\( \approx \) up to negligible probability

new \( r : \text{keyseed;}( \)
\[
(x : \text{bitstring}) \rightarrow_N \text{mac}'(x, k\text{gen}'(r)), \\
(m : \text{bitstring}, t : \text{macstring}) \rightarrow_N \text{find } j \leq N \text{ suchthat defined}(x[j]) \&\& \\
(m = x[j]) \&\& \text{check}'(m, k\text{gen}'(r), t) \text{ then true else false}
\]

The prover understands such specifications of primitives.
MACs: formal implementation

The prover applies the previous rule automatically in any (polynomial-time) context, perhaps containing several occurrences of \textit{mac} and or \textit{check}:

- Each occurrence of \textit{mac} is replaced with \textit{mac}'

- Each occurrence of \textit{check} is replaced with a \textit{find} that looks in all arrays of computed MACs (one array for each occurrence of function \textit{mac}).
Stream ciphers

Similarly, the security of stream ciphers is expressed as follows:

$$\text{dec}(\text{enc}(m, k\text{gen}(r), r'), k\text{gen}(r)) = m$$

$$\text{new } r : \text{keyseed}; (x : \text{bitstring}) \rightarrow N \text{ new } r' : \text{IV}; \text{enc}(x, k\text{gen}(r), r')$$

$$\approx \text{up to negligible probability}$$

$$\text{new } r : \text{keyseed}; (x : \text{bitstring}) \rightarrow N \text{ new } r' : \text{IV}; \text{enc}'(Z(x), k\text{gen}'(r), r')$$

A stream cipher is non-deterministic, length-revealing, resistant to Chosen Plaintext Attacks (CPA).

$Z(x)$ is the bitstring of the same length as $x$ containing only zeroes (for all $x : \text{nonce}$, $Z(x) = Z\text{nonce}$, ...).
Syntactic transformations

- **Expansion of if/find/let**: replace an expression if/find/let with a process, by duplicating the code that follows the test. This corresponds to performing a case analysis.

- **Single assignment renaming**: when a variable is assigned at several places, rename it with a distinct name for each assignment. (Not completely trivial because of array references.)

- **Expansion of assignments**: replacing a variable with its value. (Not completely trivial because of array references.)
Simplification and elimination of collisions

Terms are simplified according to equalities that come from:

- **Assignments**: let \( x = M \) in \( P \) implies that \( x = M \) in \( P \)

- **Tests**: if \( M = N \) then \( P \) implies that \( M = N \) in \( P \)

- **Definitions of cryptographic primitives**

- When a `find` guarantees that \( x[j] \) is defined, equalities that hold at definition of \( x \) also hold under the find (after substituting \( j \) for array indexes)

- **Elimination of collisions**: for example, if \( N \) is created by `new`, \( N[i] = N[j] \) implies \( i = j \), up to negligible probability
Proof strategy: advice

- One tries to execute each transformation given by the definition of a cryptographic primitive.

- When it fails, it tries to analyze why the transformation failed, and suggests syntactic transformations that could make it work.

- One tries to execute these syntactic transformations. (If they fail, they may also suggest other syntactic transformations, which are then executed.)

- We retry the cryptographic transformation, and so on.
Results

For the moment, tested on two protocols:

- **Otway-Rees**, secrecy of the exchanged key successfully proved (runtime 1.15 s on a Pentium M 1.8 GHz).

- **Yahalom**: the original version is not proved, because the protocol is not secure, at least using encrypt-then-mac as definition of encryption (runtime 0.62 s).

  There is a confirmation round \(\{N_B\}_K\) where \(K\) is the exchanged key. This message may reveal some information on \(K\).

  If we remove this confirmation round, the secrecy of \(K\) is proved (runtime 0.61 s).
$M, Na, Nb$ fresh nonces; $K_{ab}$ fresh key created by the server.

1. $A \rightarrow B \quad M, A, B, e_1 = \{Na, M, A, B\}_{K_{as}}$
2. $B \rightarrow S \quad M, A, B, e_1, \{Nb, M, A, B\}_{K_{bs}}$
3. $S \rightarrow B \quad M, e_2 = \{Na, K_{ab}\}_{K_{as}}, \{Nb, K_{ab}\}_{K_{bs}}$
4. $B \rightarrow A \quad M, e_2$

Encryption implemented as encrypt-then-mac:

\(
\{M\}_k \text{ is in fact new } r; e = \text{enc}(M, k, r); e, \text{mac}(e, mk).\)

$A, B, \text{ and } S$ may also talk to dishonest participants.
Proof of Otway-Rees (1)

Expand if/let/find; Simplify
Remove useless assignments

Remove assignments to $mK_{bs}$
Single assignment renaming of $Rmkey$ (mac key in the key table)
Remove assignments $Rmkey_1$, $Rmkey_2$, $Rmkey_3$

Security of $mac$ for $mK_{bs}$
Expand if/let/find; Simplify
Remove useless assignments

Remove assignments to $mK_{as}$

Security of $mac$ for $mK_{as}$
Expand if/let/find; Simplify
Remove useless assignments
Proof of Otway-Rees (2)

Remove assignments to $K_{bs}$
Single assignment renaming of $Rkey$ (encryption key in the key table)
Remove assignments $Rkey1$, $Rkey2$, $Rkey3$
Security of $enc$ for $K_{bs}$
Expand if/let/find; Simplify
Remove useless assignments

Remove assignments to $K_{as}$
Security of $enc$ for $K_{as}$
Expand if/let/find; Simplify
Remove useless assignments

Single assignment renaming of $K_{ab}$
Simplify
Success!
Conclusion

Hopefully a promising approach, but still some work to do:

- Extension to other cryptographic primitives: public-key cryptography (encryption and signatures), hash functions, Diffie-Hellman, xor. (small extensions to the format of primitive specifications, improvements to the simplification algorithm)

- Extension to other security properties: semantic security of the key, authenticity, . . .

- More experiments.

- Detailed proofs.
I warmly thank David Pointcheval for his advice and explanations of the computational proofs of protocols. This project would not have been possible without him.

Thank you for your attention.

Questions?